- نويسنده غلامرضا عینی
- همكار رضا توکلیمقدم
- همكار Naveed Ahmed Wassam
- نام نشريه
Journal of Optimization in industrial Engineering
- كد نشريه
NA-05-XXX-219
- زمان انتشار
مرداد 1405
- شماره نشريه
Vol. 19. Issue 1 Spring 2026
- صاحب امتياز
Islamic Azad University, Qazvin Branch
- زبان
English
Contracts are used for coordination in many supply chain alliances. Since bi-lateral contracts are significantly more successful and profitable than uni-contracts, this study examines issues of implementing bi-lateral contracts based on game theory and government intervention to increase the production of green products in the supply chain of production and distribution. Using the game theory model between these two supply chain members and the intervening government, this study seeks to make it possible for more green products to enter the market through greater cooperation between producers and distributors. Thus, the distributor orders the producer to produce the green product, and the producer also produces the regular product for himself, which is placed on the market by the distributor, in addition to the customization obtained by the distribution. The government is attempting to incentivize producers and distributors to produce green products by employing taxes and subsidies. Specifically, for each unit of a customized green product produced, the producer will not be taxed, and the distributor will receive a subsidy for ordering green products. According to the research, if the government's goal is a green environment, in addition to penalties and incentives such as taxes and subsidies, it should create appropriate infrastructure, amend laws and regulations, etc., and provide conditions for supply chain members to give producers the necessary incentive to produce green products. Enhanced cooperation among supply chain members can lead to increased production and distribution of green products as well as improved profitability for all supply members. Our numerical results show that the manufacturer produces 200 units of regular products and 1500 units of green custom products, yielding profits of 2,607,180 and 1,508,140 for the manufacturer and distributor, respectively, while the government achieves its minimum expected profit of 290,560. Sensitivity analysis reveals that increasing the base price of regular products reduces green production and decreases both players' profits, while a higher green product price increases green production and enhances all players' benefits. These findings quantify the impact of government intervention on supply chain coordination and environmental outcomes.